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Summary 
 
 
■Foreign aid looms large in the public discourse; and international development assistance remains 
squarely on most policy agendas concerned with growth, poverty and inequality in Africa and 
elsewhere in the developing world. The present review takes a retrospective look at how foreign aid 
has evolved since World War II in response to a dramatically changing global political and 
economic context. I review the aid process and associated trends in the volume and distribution of 
aid and categorize some of the key goals, principles and institutions of the aid system. The evidence 
on whether aid has been effective in furthering economic growth and development is discussed in 
some detail. I add perspective and identify some critical unresolved issues. I finally turn to the 
current development debate and discuss some key concerns, which I believe should be kept in mind 
in formulating any agenda for aid in the future.■ 
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Aid and Development 
 
Finn Tarp*
 
 
Foreign aid has undergone many fundamental shifts since the middle of the last century. After a 
timid start in the 1950s, the multi- and bilateral aid system grew up during the 1960s and 1970s 
alongside the more traditional colonial relations, which continued to influence interactions between 
the North and the South. The set of institutions through which aid was allocated became gradually 
more complex, and the same goes for the various aid modalities. Growth remained for a long period 
of time in the 1950s and 1960s alone as the main and overriding goal of aid; but step by step more 
aims were added. New development strategies were formulated during the 1970s, and aid thinking 
took yet another dramatic turn in the 1980s. Macroeconomic crisis set in and while short run 
stabilization and structural adjustment policies demanded overriding attention, the global economic 
architecture started to change in ways few could foresee at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944. 
Aid is a scarce resource, so it is relatively easy to reach agreement that it is meaningful to 
discuss how it should be allocated. It is much more complicated to arrive at a common position in 
deciding whether focus should be on the needs of developing countries as measured by for example 
the extent of poverty or on their potential for growth, see Llavador and Roemer (2001). While 
resource allocation is at the very core of economics, lack of consensus about key causal 
relationships and the appropriate levels of aggregation and time perspective are pronounced in the 
aid literature (Kanbur, 2001). This is undoubtedly a result of the great complexity of the 
development challenge itself, but accumulated professional knowledge and insights seem to fare 
relatively poorly in the often highly ideological development debate. An example is the set of issues 
surrounding equity and development, addressed in the 2006 World Development Report (World 
Bank, 2005a). Similarly, economic growth should neither stand alone nor be perceived as an 
obstacle to poverty reduction as argued from contrasting ideological perspectives. Growth is 
indispensable for sustained poverty reduction in the poorest countries, and growth tends to reduce 
poverty as shown by Ravallion (2001). At the same time, there is great variation in the data on 
growth and poverty reduction. Aid can potentially help reduce poverty via macro-growth, but the 
ultimate impact is closely related with as yet insufficiently understood microeconomic, institutional 
and deeper structural factors.  
Foreign aid and its effectiveness in promoting growth and development in developing 
countries has been an area of intense controversy ever since Rosenstein-Rodan advocated aid to 
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe (1943). Early optimism and confidence in the impact of foreign 
aid have certainly been tempered with time. Browsing through successive editions of a leading text 
book in development economics provides a telling illustration. In the first edition of his ‘Leading 
Issues in Economic Development’, Meier (1964) dedicated some 18 pages to the issue of foreign 
aid. He started out by asking: ‘How much aid?’ By the time of the 6th edition (Meier, 1995), the 
treatment of foreign aid had been cut in half, and the questions raised were: ‘Why official 
assistance?’, and ‘Does aid work?’; and in the 2000 edition (Meier and Rauch, 2000), ‘foreign aid’ 
is not even listed in the index.  
 
* I am grateful to Eva Rytter Sunesen and Christoffer Sonne-Schmidt for research assistance in elaborating the present 
paper and to colleagues from the University of Copenhagen for comments and collaboration. A special thanks to Phil 
Abbott, Carl Johan Dalgaard and Theo Larsen. Thanks for good advice are also due to participants at (i) the 
Conference on Foreign Aid Policy organized by the Swedish Economic Council on 15 May 2006 and (ii) the Nordic 
Conference in Development Conference 2006 held in Oslo on 22 June 2006. The usual caveats apply. 
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Meanwhile the debate about the usefulness and design of foreign aid has continued 
unabated. Some insist aid is a waste of resources and even harmful to aid receiving countries, 
Dichter (2005). They point in particular to Africa and scores of failed projects and swiftly conclude 
that aid has been an outright disaster. Others are disappointed and sceptical, a prominent example 
being Easterly (2001, 2003, 2005, 2006), who highlights aid’s inability to buy growth. Birdsall, 
Rodrik and Subramanian (2005) view the potential impact of aid as seriously circumscribed, but 
remain largely supportive. A complementary approach in the middle ground is that aid has worked 
in the past in furthering growth and development, see Tarp (2000). Aid is not equally effective 
everywhere, and much remains to be learnt about how aid impacts in theory and practice. Focus 
should therefore be both on ways and means to improve the effectiveness of foreign aid 
disbursements and on increasing the total flow of resources. A final approach is to emphasize that a 
doubling of worldwide aid flows is our generation’s challenge, a moral obligation of rich countries 
that will send ‘forth mighty currents of hope’ and lead to ‘the end of poverty’, see Sachs (2005).  
Departing from the so-called micro-macro paradox from the 1980s, formulated by Mosley 
(1987), to which I shall return in Section 4, the analysis of aid’s impact on growth became 
dominated by macro-econometric frameworks during the second half of the 1990s. Much of this 
debate has focused on whether the effectiveness of aid is conditional on policy or whether aid can 
be expected to have a separate and positive impact, independent of policy. This has involved a 
mixture of concerns. They range from technically demanding econometric modelling issues to 
fundamentally different approaches to the design and implementation of development strategy and 
policy. Overall, the view that aid works in promoting growth and development has gained ground in 
recent years in the academic literature; but disagreement remains characteristic in assessments of 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for aid to have a positive contribution on the development 
process. The same goes in relation to (i) different views on what constitutes ‘good’ economic policy 
and how economic policy and deeper structural characteristics interact with the efficiency of foreign 
aid, and (ii) the institutional framework through which aid is channelled. Aid has for example been 
subjected to critique for being donor driven, and this has led to repeated demands for new forms of 
partnership, see Helleiner (2000). One response has been to shift attention to recipient country 
‘ownership’, but what this means in theory and practice remains subject to differing interpretations. 
Nevertheless, widespread calls have in the last few years been made for ‘a big push’ or a 
Marshall Plan for Africa. Sachs (2005) is a passionate spokesman for this approach, which is set out 
in the UN Millennium Project Report (2005), and also The World Economic Forum (2005) and the 
Commission for Africa (2005) report can be consulted. The Commission for Africa was launched 
by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair in February 2004 with the aim of taking a fresh look at 
Africa’s past and present and the international community’s role in its development path. These 
initiatives have called forth both praise and critique, with Sachs and Easterly appearing to occupy 
opposing ends of the spectrum. Viewing their assessments from the perspective of historical 
developments in foreign aid, on the one hand, and the analytical literature on aid effectiveness, on 
the other, is a general aim of this paper. 
The remainder of this study is structured in six parts.1 In Section 1, I define what is meant 
by foreign aid and provide selected data on amounts and trends involved. Section 2 contains general 
historical background, while Sections 3 and 4 turn to the allocation and impact of foreign aid. In 
Section 5, I discuss the current debate, while Section 6 concludes. 
 
1 In preparing this review, I rely both on field experience and a variety of academic outputs. They include (i) a 
Routledge book volume on ‘Foreign Aid and Development: Lessons learnt and Directions for the Future’ (see Tarp, 
2000); (ii) several articles published over the past five years, including in particular work with Dalgaard, Hansen and 
Roland-Holst listed in the references; and (iii) the notes from my inaugural lecture held at the University of Copenhagen 
on 29 November 2002 under the heading ‘Reflections on the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid’. 
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1. What is foreign aid? 
 
What is foreign aid? Loosely speaking it covers governmental transfers to poor countries that are 
destined for developmental purposes. For a more precise definition it is useful to turn to the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. DAC is the principal body through 
which the OECD deals with issues related to co-operation with developing countries. According to 
DAC, the term ‘foreign aid’ or ‘development assistance’ refers to financial flows that qualify as 
Official Development Assistance (ODA). ODA is defined as the sum of grants and loans to aid 
recipients that are: (a) undertaken by the official sector of the donor country; (b) with promotion of 
economic development and welfare in recipient countries as the main objective; (c) at concessional 
financial terms, where the grant element is equal to at least 25 per cent.2  
In addition to financial flows, technical co-operation costs are included in ODA; but grants, 
loans and credits for military purposes are excluded, and transfer payments to private individuals 
are in general not counted. The same goes for private charity, commercial loans and foreign direct 
investment (FDI). 
While the OECD operates with a consolidated list of recipient countries to capture all aid-
like flows, this list was until 2005 divided into two parts. Only aid to ‘traditional’ developing 
countries counted as ODA. For these (Part I) countries there is a long-standing United Nations (UN) 
target from 1970 that they should receive 0.7 per cent of donors’ Gross National Income (GNI) as 
aid. Assistance to the ‘more advanced’ Eastern European and ‘more advanced’ developing (Part II) 
countries was recorded separately as ‘official aid’ (OA), which was not included as part of ODA. It 
can finally be noted that DAC countries account for almost 95 per cent of all aid flows.3  
In 2002 the total amount of foreign aid disbursed by donors to developing countries and 
multilateral organisations reached 61.5 billion US$ (Table 1). Table 1 also shows that the average 
citizen in the OECD-DAC countries contributed less than US$ 68 as ODA in 2002. This can be 
compared to a figure of around US$ 52 in 1960-73 and almost US$ 77 in 1992.4 It is equally clear 
from the table that the UN target of 0.7 per cent of GNI is with a few exceptions very far from being 
reached. In this perspective, it is hardly surprising that some such as Sach (2005) and many others 
find present levels of aid unacceptably low. It can also be noted that multilateral organisations 
disbursed some 30 per cent of total foreign aid (Table 2), with the IMF and World Bank being the 
major channel, followed by the EU, the UN and the regional development banks. 
Table 3 gives an overview of aid per capita and aid in per cent of GNI in aid receiving Part I 
countries with a population of more than 2 million. It is a widespread perception in for example the 
US that foreign aid amounts to a very significant resource, in both absolute and relative terms, and 
aid is indeed not an insignificant flow measured relative to developing country production and 
income. At the same time, aid does not appear that sizeable when measured in relation to GNI or 
 
2 Conventionally the market rate of interest used to assess a loan is taken as 10 per cent. Thus, while the grant element is 
nil for a loan carrying an interest rate of 10 per cent, it is 100 per cent for a pure grant, and lies between these two limits 
for a soft loan. In calculating total ODA no adjustment is made to take account of the smaller grant element of loans. 
The value of grants and the nominal value of loans that qualify are simply added up. 
3 The OECD decided in 2005 to revert to a single list of ODA recipients, abolishing what is referred to as Part II in what 
follows. The new DAC list of ODA recipients is with a few exceptions consistent with World Bank practice, see 
http://www.oecd.org/document/56/0,2340,en_2649_34447_35832055_1_1_1_1,00.html for full details on the rather 
complicated set of changes that have taken place over the years.  
4 Note that constant 2002 prices are relied on in Table 1. Moreover, only sixteen of the now 22 DAC member countries 
had joined the DAC before 1970, so the concept of an ’average DAC citizen’ is not strictly the same over time, see 
http://www.oecd.org/document/38/0,2340,en_2649_33721_1893350_1_1_1_1,00.html.  
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government budgets in the donor countries or in comparison with the population size of aid 
receiving countries.  
 
 
Table 1. Net ODA disbursements by donor 
  2002 Prices - $ Billion  Percent of Total 
  ODA per Capita (2002 Prices - $) Percent of Donor GNI
           
  1960-73 1992 1998 2002  1960-73 1992 1998 2002 
United States   14.7 14.1 9.4 13.3  47.1 23.0 18.3 21.6 
 74.9 55.3 34.8 46.1  0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1
Japan   2.5 10.5 10.4 9.3  8.0 17.1 20.2 15.1 
 24.5 84.4 82.2 72.8  0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2
France   3.9 7.2 5.1 5.5  12.8 11.8 9.9 8.9 
 80.6 126.2 87.3 92.3  0.8 0.6 0.4 0.4
Germany   2.8 6.6 4.9 5.3  9.1 10.7 9.5 8.7 
 48.0 81.4 59.5 64.5  0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3
United Kingdom   3.2 3.6 3.8 4.9  10.2 5.8 7.4 8.0 
 58.0 61.3 64.7 83.5  0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3
DK, NL, NO and SE   1.3 7.1 7.4 8.7  4.2 11.5 14.4 14.1 
 44.6 211.9 217.0 248.2  0.3 1.0 0.8 0.9
Other DAC   2.6 10.9 9.4 11.3  8.5 17.8 18.2 18.4 
 23.0 57.9 46.0 53.6  0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3
Non-DAC   .. 1.4 1.0 3.2  .. 2.2 2.0 5.2 
 .. .. .. 67.2  .. 0.3 0.1 0.4
Total   31.0 61.3 51.5 61.5  100 100 100 100 
 51.6 76.9 61.7 67.6  0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2
Bilateral ODA   26.5 41.9 34.9 43.5  85.5 68.3 67.8 70.7 
Multilateral ODA   4.9 19.1 16.6 18.0  15.6 31.1 32.2 29.3 
           
Notes: Denmark (DK) since 1978, Netherlands (NL) since 1975, Norway (NO) since 1976, and Sweden (SE) 
since 1975 have all had ODA in percent of GNI above 0.7. Luxembourg has been above the UN ODA target of 
0.7% since 2000. 
Source: OECD (2004). 
 
 
Table 2. Multilateral aid disbursements 
  2002 Prices - $ Billion  Percent 
  1960-73 1992 1998 2002  1960-73 1992 1998 2002 
Multilateral, Total  2.8 16.3 14.4 17.0  100 100 100 100 
of which:           
United Nations   0.9 5.3 2.6 3.8  31.4 32.6 17.9 22.1 
IMF and WB  0.8 5.3 5.0 6.0  30.0 32.7 35.0 35.1 
European Commision 
  0.6 3.8 4.6 5.1  23.1 23.1 32.3 30.3 
Regional 
Development Banks  0.4 1.6 1.9 1.8  15.4 10.0 13.2 10.5 
Other Multilateral 
Institutions   0.0 0.3 0.2 0.4  0.0 1.6 1.6 2.1 
           
Source: OECD (2004). 
 
 5
 
Table 3: Average annual (1993-2002) aid shares for countries with populations larger than 2 million 
Country Aid per capita      Country Country
Aid in %  
of GNI Country 
Malaysia 0.3   23.5 Tunisia Saudi Arabia 0.0  7.4 Georgia 
Saudi Arabia 1.2   24.1 Burundi Malaysia 0.0  7.6 Papua New Guinea 
Brazil 1.7   24.1 Sri Lanka Argentina 0.0  8.1 Cote d'Ivoire 
India 1.7   26.1 Togo Venezuela, RB 0.0  8.3 Nepal 
Nigeria 1.8   28.1 Zimbabwe Brazil 0.1  8.4 Togo 
Venezuela, RB 1.8   28.2 Madagascar Mexico 0.1  8.4 Angola 
China 2.0   29.2 Niger Turkey 0.1  9.0 Bolivia 
Mexico 2.0   29.3 Chad Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.2  9.3 Honduras 
Myanmar 2.2   30.6 Somalia Chile 0.2  9.3 Guinea 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 2.5   30.9 Liberia Costa Rica 0.2  9.9 Albania 
Argentina 3.4   31.1 Egypt, Arab Rep. Uruguay 0.2  10.1 Tajikistan 
Turkey 3.5   32.0 Tanzania Colombia 0.3  10.2 Ghana 
Korea, Dem. Rep. 4.1   32.3 Angola China 0.3  10.9 Serbia and Montenegro 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 5.2   33.1 Uganda South Africa 0.4  11.3 Madagascar 
Uzbekistan 5.2   33.5 Ghana Oman 0.4  11.6 Senegal 
Cuba 5.2   34.2 Cambodia Panama 0.4  11.7 Haiti 
Colombia 5.3   35.1 Central African Republic India 0.4  11.8 Benin 
Turkmenistan 7.0   35.3 Cameroon Croatia 0.5  11.8 Central African Republic 
Costa Rica 7.1   39.6 Burkina Faso Thailand 0.5  11.9 Cambodia 
Indonesia 7.3   40.9 Mali Algeria 0.6  12.0 Armenia 
Chile 7.4   42.7 Eritrea Dominican Republic 0.7  12.5 Congo, Rep. 
Kazakhstan 8.6   42.9 Benin Kazakhstan 0.7  13.5 Chad 
Iraq 8.8   43.0 Sierra Leone Nigeria 0.7  13.7 Uganda 
Pakistan 8.8   43.3 Georgia Peru 0.9  14.2 Kyrgyz Republic 
Sudan 9.2   44.4 El Salvador Turkmenistan 0.9  14.2 Ethiopia 
Algeria 9.2   44.8 Malawi Indonesia 1.0  15.1 Tanzania 
Bangladesh 9.8   45.2 Haiti Jamaica 1.0  15.5 Niger 
South Africa 10.6   45.2 Kyrgyz Republic Ecuador 1.1  16.2 Burkina Faso 
Thailand 10.8   45.7 Guinea Philippines 1.1  16.3 West Bank and Gaza 
Philippines 11.4   55.3 Cote d'Ivoire Paraguay 1.2  17.0 Mali 
Dominican Republic 12.2   55.6 Lao PDR Tunisia 1.2  17.6 Lao PDR 
Afghanistan 12.8   56.5 Lebanon Uzbekistan 1.4  18.2 Burundi 
Uruguay 13.0   58.3 Senegal Guatemala 1.4  19.3 Liberia 
Panama 13.2   63.0 Papua New Guinea Lebanon 1.7  21.5 Eritrea 
Vietnam 14.3   63.3 Serbia and Montenegro Morocco 1.8  23.1 Mongolia 
Ethiopia 14.8   64.1 Rwanda Pakistan 2.0  23.8 Zambia 
Ecuador 16.5   65.1 Congo, Rep. Syrian Arab Republic 2.0  25.4 Malawi 
Peru 17.3   65.2 Armenia El Salvador 2.6  25.7 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Syrian Arab Republic 17.5   65.6 Mozambique Egypt, Arab Rep. 2.8  27.1 Sierra Leone 
Tajikistan 18.0   71.9 Honduras Bangladesh 2.9  27.5 Mauritania 
Nepal 18.2   81.6 Bolivia Sudan 3.1  30.8 Rwanda 
Paraguay 18.7   82.6 Zambia Sri Lanka 3.2  31.6 Nicaragua 
Croatia 18.9   85.7 Albania Azerbaijan 3.8  40.3 Mozambique 
Kenya 19.7   87.0 Mongolia Vietnam 4.3      
Yemen, Rep. 20.4   100.4 Jordan Congo, Dem. Rep. 4.9      
Azerbaijan 20.7   103.9 Mauritania Zimbabwe 5.2      
Morocco 20.9   130.4 Nicaragua Yemen, Rep. 5.4      
Jamaica 21.4   186.1 Bosnia and Herzegovina Cameroon 5.9      
Guatemala 22.2   233.6 West Bank and Gaza Jordan 6.3      
Oman 22.6       Kenya 6.8      
Note: Aid per capita is constant US $ and aid in percent of GNI are averages of annual observations. 
Source: World Bank (2004). 
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Turning to the aid receiving countries, the available data confirm that global aid levels have 
kept pace with both incomes and population in the developing world during the past three decades. 
Figure 1 presents ratios of total ODA to GNI and population in aid receiving countries. It may be 
comforting to some that ODA per capita almost doubled in real terms; but perhaps the most 
revealing aspect here is the downturn from 1991-92 after the steady increase in the previous decade, 
and the fact that aid has only remained more or less stable as a share of GNI in recipient countries. 
 
 
.5
1 
1.5
2 
2.5
1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Aid per capita 
Aid in % of GNI
Note: ODA and GNI in constant 1995 US$, and shares normalized to 1 in 1970
Source: World Bank (2004) 
Figure 1. ODA in percent of recipient
population and GNI
 
 
Figure 2 shows that the allocation of aid from 1993 to 2002 as measured by the aid to GNI 
ratio in aid receiving countries is highly skewed. Most Part I countries received aid on the order of 
3.1 per cent of their GNI per year with a median of 6.8 per cent. This corresponds to a distribution 
of aid per capita with a mode of 18.5 US$ per year with a median of 34.6 US$. Illustrative country 
examples have been added to Figure 2, and they demonstrate that the relative size of the aid inflow 
varies significantly among countries such as Vietnam, Bolivia, Tanzania and Mozambique.  
The 15.1 per cent size of the aid to GNI ratio in for example Tanzania may seem high. It 
should be kept in mind, however, that this share reflects not only the size of the aid flow, but also 
the very low level of income. Income per capita in Tanzania has just recently grown to around US$ 
300 per capita, so Tanzania only received about US$ 32 per capita per year in foreign aid from 1993 
to 2002.  
Modest expectations are on this background advisable when analysing the overall impact of 
past aid on growth.  Many constraints have hampered growth in Tanzania, and aid has been used for 
a multitude of purposes, which are in many cases only indirectly related to generating economic 
return. 
 
 7
 Mozambique (40.3%)
Tanzania (15.1%)
Bolivia (9.0%)
Vietnam (4.3%)
Bolivia (65.6$)
Mozambique (65.6$)
Tanzania (32.0$)Vietnam (14.3$) 
0 
.01
.02
.03
.04
.05
 
Aid in % of GNI 
Mode: 3.1% 
Median: 6.8% 
Iqr: 13.8%point 
Min: 0.01% 
Max: 100.7% 
A
0 20 40 60 80 100
id per capita, US$ 
Mode: 18.5$ 
Median: 34.6$ 
Iqr: 69.1$ 
Min: 0.3$ 
Max: 3742.2$ 
Note: Kernel density using Gaussian kernel. The hight of the graph reflects
         the (weighted) average number of observations in an interval around the midpoint. 
         Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services
Source: World Bank (2004) 
Figure 2. Density of average annual (1993-2002)
ODA shares
 
 
 
2. Historical background 
 
Foreign aid in its modern form emerged out of the disruption that followed World War II. The 
international economic system had collapsed, and war-ravaged Europe faced a critical shortage of 
capital and an acute need for physical reconstruction. The response was the European Recovery 
Programme, commonly known as the Marshall Plan. During the peak years the US transferred some 
2-3 per cent of its national income to help restore Europe. The motives behind the US aid were 
multifaceted, ranging from the selfish to the generous. Containing communism around the Soviet 
bloc and trying to secure access to raw materials and gain a leading role in the global trade and 
investment system were critically important nationalistic concerns. Altruistic aims also played a 
role and helped mobilize support from a wide spectrum of political opinion. The Marshall Plan, 
which was administered by the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), the 
predecessor of the OECD, was implemented on schedule, and its success fuelled highly optimistic 
expectations about the future effectiveness of foreign aid.  
After the success of the Marshall Plan the attention of industrialized nations turned to the 
developing countries, many of which became independent around 1960. Economic growth in a 
state-led planning tradition became a key objective during the 1950s and 1960s, and it was widely 
believed that poverty and inequality would be quickly eliminated through growth and 
modernization (‘trickle down’). A major part of the rapidly increasing bilateral flows during the 
1950s came from the US, but colonial ties remained strong, and developing regions continued to 
receive bilateral (country-to-country) support from the former colonial powers, notably France and 
the United Kingdom. Yet, the 1960s was also the decade where a range of new bilateral donor 
agencies was established in, for example, the Nordic countries. They accounted for much of the 
increase in aid flows in the 1970s.  
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A transition toward more independent, multilateral relations began to emerge during the 
1960s. This created a constituency for foreign aid, and the non-aligned movement gave for some 
time an articulated developing country focus to this voice,5 as did the various organs of the UN, 
which accounted for around one third of multilateral assistance during 1960-73 as shown in Table 2. 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) (or World Bank), established 
at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, play a central role in multilateral development assistance, 
especially following the creation of the International Development Association (IDA) in 1960. IDA 
channels resources to the poorest countries on ‘soft’ conditions alongside the regional development 
banks, formed from 1959 to 1966, and the European Commission. 
The original Marshall Plan was built around support to finance general categories of imports 
and strengthen the balance of payments (i.e. programme aid), but from the early 1950s project aid 
became the dominating aid modality. Some donors continued to supply programme aid, but aid was 
increasingly disbursed for the implementation of specific capital investment projects and associated 
technical assistance to support advances in infrastructure and productive sectors.  
The multilateralism of aid became somewhat more pronounced after the mid-1970s, when 
the UN, World Bank and other multilateral agencies expanded their activities quite considerably, 
and the share of multilateral aid in total aid has since then remained close to 30 per cent. The 1970s 
also saw an increased focus on employment, income distribution, and poverty alleviation as 
essential objectives of development and foreign aid. The effectiveness of trickle-down was widely 
questioned, and new strategies referred to as ‘basic human needs’ and ‘redistribution with growth’ 
were formulated. Nevertheless, the typical project aid modality remained largely unchanged; and 
micro-economic project evaluation, also referred to as cost-benefit analysis (CBA), was expanded 
and widely relied on in the aid debate. Many projects were favourably evaluated, and during the 
1960s and 1970s, economic progress was visible in much of the developing world. Many 
developing countries borrowed heavily during the 1970s, and this made eminent sense at the time. 
Inflation was high and credit exceedingly cheap. After the first oil crisis in 1973, commercial banks 
started playing a large role in international lending by recycling OPEC petrodollars and issuing 
general-purpose loans to developing countries to provide balance of payment support and expand 
exports. Bilateral donors and the international financial institutions (IFIs) were no longer alone on 
the lending scene, and international lending surged, permitting high growth with little debt-
servicing difficulty. 
The ‘golden era’ of the 1960s and 1970s came to an abrupt end at the beginning of the 
1980s. The second oil shock in 1979 reversed economic conditions, and there was a huge increase 
in interest rates due to the economic stabilization policies in the developed countries, in particular in 
the US. Developing countries were faced with a combination of higher oil prices, import 
compression and a significant decrease in export opportunities due to slower overall global growth. 
The international debt crisis erupted, and macroeconomic imbalance became characteristic in many 
developing countries. It became evident that the downturn was longer lasting, not temporary as in 
1973, and numerous debtor countries with depleted foreign exchange reserves, including bigger 
third world countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and the Philippines, had to turn to the IMF. 
On the political scene Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher came to power in the US and UK, and 
in the World Bank Anne Krueger became Vice President and Chief Economist, replacing Hollis 
Chenery. This change was symbolic and substantive (Kanbur, 2003). Economic circumstances in 
 
5 The first offical non-aligned movement (NAM) summit was held in September of 1961. Among the prominent 
developing country leaders, who helped NAM get off the ground, were Tito of Yugoslavia, Nehru of India, Abdel 
Nassar of Egypt and Sukarno of Indonesia. Formally speaking, the non-aligned movement is an international 
organization of over 100 developing countries, which consider themselves not formally aligned with or against any 
major power bloc. While influential during the 1960s and 1970s, NAM started loosing influence in the 1970s. 
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the developing countries and the relations between the North and South had changed radically. The 
crisis hit hard, especially in many African countries – progress over previous decades ground to a 
halt, inflation got out of control and the deficit in the balance payments could not be financed on a 
sustainable basis. Focus in development strategy and policy shifted to internal domestic policy 
failure, and achieving macroeconomic balance (externally and internally) became widely perceived 
as an essential prerequisite for renewed development. In parallel a series of damaging political and 
military conflicts broke out, including mass homicides, major refugee problems and famines in a 
variety of African countries. 
‘Rolling back the state’ turned into a rallying call in the subsequent structural adjustment 
efforts, and reliance on market forces, outward orientation, and the role of the private sector, 
including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were emphasized by the World Bank and others. 
In parallel, poverty alleviation somehow slipped out of view in mainstream agendas for economic 
reform, but remained at the centre of attention in more un-orthodox thinking such as the ‘adjustment 
with a human face’ approach of the UN Children’s Fund (Cornia, Jolly and Stewart, 1987).  
At the same time, bilateral donors and international agencies struggled with how to channel 
resources to the developing world. The changing economic context and future perspectives had 
altered the development scene. Quick-disbursing macroeconomic programme assistance, such as 
balance of payments support and sector budget support, which were not tied to investment projects, 
and which could be justified under the headings of stabilisation and adjustment, appeared to be an 
ideal solution to the dilemma of maintaining the resource flow and the desire to promote policy 
reform. Financial programme aid and adjustment loans (and eventually debt relief) became 
fashionable and policy conditionality more widespread. In other words, a rationale had been found 
for maintaining the flow of resources, which corresponded well with the orthodox guidelines for 
good policy summarized by the ‘Washington consensus’ (Williamson, 1997).6  
Total aid therefore continued to grow steadily in real terms until the early 1990s, and as a 
rising share of the growing national income of the donor community more than tripled during 1970–
90. After 1992, total aid flows started to decline in absolute terms (especially in the US) until the 
turn of the millennium. Many reasons account for the fall in aggregate flows after 1992. During the 
budget crisis in the US, for example, aid became an easy target for significant downsizing. The 
decline of communism and the end of the Cold War no doubt played a role as well, and the same 
can be said for the weakening patron-client relationships among the developing countries and the 
former colonial powers. The traditional support of foreign aid by vocal interest groups in the 
industrial countries receded. Bilateral and multilateral aid institutions were subjected to criticism, 
and at times characterized as blunt instruments of commercial interests in the industrial world or as 
self-interested, inefficient rent-seeking bureaucracies. Moreover, acute awareness in donor countries 
of cases of bad governance, corruption, and ‘crony capitalism’ led to scepticism about the 
credibility of governments receiving aid. The potential role of foreign aid in all this attracted 
attention, and the fear that foreign aid can generate undesirable aid dependency relationships 
became clear during the second part of the 1990s and persisted into the 21st century. In parallel, the 
perception that policy conditionality was failing to promote policy reform started to assert itself, see 
Kanbur (2000) and Svensson (2003). This assessment prompted a keen interest in new kinds of 
donor-recipient relationships. One outcome was the call for increased national ownership of aid 
programmes. Another was that World Bank and independent academic researchers started digging 
into the aid-growth relationship using modern analytical techniques. The more recent the attempts 
to develop randomized programme evaluation also appeared on the scene, see for example Duflo 
 
6 See Rodrik (2006) for a critical up-to-date review. 
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(2004).7 Meanwhile the developing world was hit hard by the Asian financial crisis, which affected 
development outcomes in a number of countries and modified the framework within which aid is 
implemented. 
Finally, when reviewing the role and impact of foreign aid, it should be kept in mind that the 
world economy has during the past few decades seen major changes in international relations that 
go far beyond the changes in foreign aid. Growth in trade, GDP and the relationship between trade 
and growth have filled volumes with statistical tables, policy analysis, and academic research. With 
reference to foreign aid, a few trends are of particular relevance.8 Figure 3 shows how global trade 
as well as ODA, GNI and FDI in aid-receiving countries evolved from 1970 onwards until after the 
turn of the millennium. It is evident that global trade has been growing faster than both GNI and aid 
flows to poor countries, especially from around the mid-1980s, so flourishing international 
commerce has not so far been associated with a boom in charitable activity. Moreover, while Figure 
3 is a bit deceptive in overstating the relative size of FDI,9 it is nevertheless clear that the relative 
importance of FDI to aid started changing very considerably in the early 1990s. 
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Figure 3. Macroeconomic indicators in aid
receiving countries
 
 
In sum, globalization has modified the context in which foreign aid is implemented. This 
suggests, on the one hand, that a broader and more refined awareness of the implications of 
coexistence between public and private investment in developing countries would be beneficial. It 
implies, on the other hand, that aid’s role in generating foreign exchange has changed relative to 
other entries on the balance of payments. 
 
 
7 I will not pursue the set of issues related to this approach to aid impact evaluation here, but see Bigsten, Gunning and 
Tarp (2006) and Thorbecke (2005) for elaboration. 
8 For further elaboration see Roland-Holst and Tarp (2004). 
9 FDI accounted for only 2.3 per cent of GDP in low- and middle-income countries in 2003, and 0.6 per cent in 1990. 
Trade was 41 percent in 1990 and 60 per cent in 2003. 
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3. Aid allocation 
 
Foreign aid has over the years been justified in public policy pronouncements in widely differing 
ways, ranging from pure altruism to the shared benefits of economic development in poor countries 
and further on to political ideology, foreign policy and commercial interests of the donor country. 
Few dispute that humanitarian sentiments have motivated donors. Action following severe natural 
calamities, which continue to be endemic in poor countries, is an example. Food and emergency 
relief also remains an important form of aid. In addition, the data available in Table 3 suggest that 
donors allocate relatively more ODA to the poorest countries. The broader validity of this casual 
observation is confirmed in cross-country econometric work, Alesina and Dollar (2000). While 
studying bilateral aid only, they conclude that most donors give more aid to poorer countries, 
ceteris paribus. They stress as well that there is considerable variation among donors. 
Emphasis on the needs of poor countries was a particularly prominent characteristic – and 
the underlying economic rationale – in much of the policy literature on foreign aid in the 1950s and 
1960s. Here focus was on estimating aid requirements in the tradition of the two-gap model 
(Chenery and Strout, 1966). The two-gap model has become somewhat unfashionable, at least in 
academia,10 and the role of aid has changed to a much more multi-dimensional set of concerns 
(Thorbecke, 2000). Economic return is by no means the only goal of aid. Nevertheless, growth and 
economic development in aid receiving countries have continued as a yardstick for the effectiveness 
of aid both in their own right and as necessary conditions for the realisation of other development 
aims such as the reduction of poverty and the achievement of broader social goals. It is from this 
perspective that the discussion in Section 4 on aid’s impact on growth should be seen. 
A second observation from Table 3 is that large, populous and poor countries, such as China 
and India receive relatively small amounts of aid in per capita terms. Smaller countries such as 
Mali, Ghana, Bolivia and Sri Lanka are given more favourable per capita treatment. This finding is 
confirmed econometrically by Alesina and Dollar. They stress, however, the critical and complex 
importance of political and strategic considerations in aid allocations.  
It is not new that selfish motives are critical in donor decisions. In the past, the Cold War 
was used as a powerful justification for providing aid to developing countries to stem the spread of 
communism. Similarly, aid from socialist governments was motivated to promote socialist political 
and economic systems. Other strategic interests play a role as well. The US has over the years 
earmarked very substantial amounts of aid to Egypt and Israel;11 being a former colony is an 
important determinant in getting access to French aid; and voting behaviour in the UN can affect aid 
allocation both bilaterally (Alesina and Dollar, 2000) and through the multilateral system 
(Andersen, Harr and Tarp, 2006). Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) and Berthélemy (2006) offer 
further valuable insight on how bilateral donors are influenced in aid allocations by their own 
strategic and commercial interest versus the development motives of aid recipients, and on the fact 
that not all donors behave the same. 
In sum, there is often a wide gap between donor rhetoric and practice when attention is on 
the size and allocation of foreign aid. This gap is illustrated by the failure of the donor community 
to meet the established international target of contributing 0.7 per cent of their national income as 
ODA. As shown in Table 1, only the group of Nordic countries and the Netherlands have 
consistently met this target, while the US contributed around 0.1 percent of the US GNI in 2002.12 
Finally, it is well established that total ODA, ODA per capita, ODA as a share of GNI and ODA as 
a share of total financial inflows vary considerably in real terms in many aid receiving countries 
 
10 Some would formulate this more strongly. See Jones (1995) and Easterly (1999) for two key references. 
11 To this list can be added Iraque and Afghanistan. For example, US aid to Iraque amounted in 2005 to US$ 3.5 billion.  
12 This share has increased in the last couple of years, but US aid as a share of US GNI remains small.  
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(see Tarp, 2006). Economic management in general and management of aid inflows in particular are 
no easy tasks in developing countries.  
 
4. The impact of foreign aid 
 
Various approaches have been tried to deal with the challenge of measuring the ‘true’ 
impact of aid on development, as reflected for example by growth or progress in social indicators.13 
One is to compare implicit or explicit targets with actual outcomes. The problem with this is that 
failure or success in reaching a target may be caused by reasons that have nothing to do with the 
provision of foreign aid. Another quite common approach is to rely on before-and-after 
comparisons, but also this line of analysis suffers from its inherent inability to attribute changes in 
observed outcomes to foreign aid. In other words, it is not satisfactory in assessing the impact of aid 
to argue casually that since growth in Africa is far from satisfactory aid ‘does not work’. Similarly, 
the fact that some aid projects have failed does not in any way prove that aid as a whole is a fiasco. 
Unsuccessful investment projects and public sector activities abound in even the best of political, 
social and economic circumstances all around the world and few would dream of lambasting private 
multinational firms for failed initiatives if the bottom line is on average satisfactory. In fact, most 
would probably agree that if investments are always successful then investor behaviour is likely to 
be too risk averse. Development is and will always be a particularly risky business, so any serious 
analysis must either (i) try to dig deeper in an attempt to uncover whether foreign aid has on 
average had a positive impact on development in aid receiving countries or not, or (ii) aim at 
identifying the mechanisms through which aid impacts on for example growth, including the 
potential positive and negative effects (i.e. returns) associated with foreign aid.  
To be able to measure the effect of aid the researcher must in principle be able to compare 
the value of a chosen indicator (such as growth or poverty reduction) in two strictly independent 
situations: with and without aid. To establish the ‘true’ measure of aid impact, the importance of all 
other circumstances that have affected a given country over time needs to be properly accounted 
for.14 Alternatively, if a group of countries is compared (with and without aid) the analyst needs to 
account for the impact on the chosen indicator of the other differences that exist among the units of 
observation, like in a controlled experiment. This is the fundamental evaluation challenge, and there 
is in social science no way of addressing this problem (i.e. the challenge of establishing an 
appropriate counterfactual) in a broadly acceptable way without making assumptions that are bound 
to be debatable, in theory and in practice.  
In Section 3 it was pointed out that aid has been given for many reasons that have little to do 
with socio-economic advancement in aid receiving countries. This has undoubtedly constrained the 
impact of aid on growth and development. The targets for aid have also varied wildly from one 
decade to the next. The same goes for the general political, social and economic circumstances as 
discussed in Section 2, and the modalities and sources of aid have changed as well. As a result, the 
conditions under which aid has had to operate have changed dramatically from one decade to the 
next. Coming up with simple answers about how aid has worked – or not worked – in promoting 
development in the past is no easy task. We can draw on history, but we do not have available the 
possibility of perfectly controlled experiments. There is, to be sure, no simple way of accounting 
properly for all the many varied and complex factors of daunting size, which have played a role in 
African development over the past 30 years – alongside foreign aid amounting to generally around 
US$ 35 per capita per year.  
 
13 See Bigsten, Gunning and Tarp (2006) for further elaboration of this point. 
14 This includes choosing the length of individual time units and an appropriate overall time horizon, which are by no 
means simple choices.  
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In any case, the past decades have witnessed a massive outpouring of studies on the 
effectiveness of foreign aid. This topic has been a central and recurring theme with which many 
development economists, subscribing to the different paradigms of development thinking have 
grappled. The question whether aid works or not has been approached from different 
methodological and ideological perspectives. More specifically: (i) the impact of aid has been 
evaluated at the micro- and macroeconomic level; (ii) cross-country comparisons as well as single-
country case studies have been relied on; and (iii) aid effectiveness research includes broad surveys 
of a qualitative and inter-disciplinary nature as well as more quantitative econometric work.15 As a 
point of departure for the remainder of this paper it is relevant to stress that there is widespread 
agreement in the literature that aid has in many cases been highly successful at the microeconomic 
level. The most rigorous project evaluations are done by the World Bank, and the reports from the 
Operations Evaluation Department (OED) of the World Bank are generally encouraging. For the 
period 1993-2002 an average rate of return of 22 per cent has been noted and decent project rates of 
return have over the years been reported regularly in one survey after the other, including for 
example Mosley (1987) and Cassen (1994). Overall, a mass of project evidence has been collected, 
and few dispute that aid interventions have worked in helping improve social outcomes through 
better health, helping promote develop appropriate technology (i.e. the green revolution) etc. Yet, 
doubts about aid’s overall impact on growth and development linger on, and the question is raised 
whether all this adds up at the macro level. 
It is therefore relevant to turn to how the empirical literature on aid’s macroeconomic impact 
on growth has evolved. This choice of focus can be justified on several grounds. First, as an 
extension of the microeconomic evidence, numerous case studies support according to the World 
Bank (1998) the observation that aid has, at times, been a spectacular success. Yet, in establishing 
causal links, the critical challenge is as noted above to pinpoint a credible counterfactual, and it is 
never straightforward to generalize from case studies. Another reason for the popularity in the past 
10-15 years of the cross-country panel data approach is that it makes it possible to move well 
beyond simplistic aid-growth correlation analysis, where the analysis of causal effects is indeed 
rather primitive. It should, in fact, come as no surprise to the informed observer that the simple 
correlation coefficient between growth and aid can easily turn out to be insignificant, or negative. 
Donors allocate as already discussed more aid to poorer countries, subject to difficulties and shocks 
of many kinds, including natural and man made calamities. When countries have done well for a 
while so average income has gone up, donors tend to transfer less aid and eventually they will 
withdraw (as it happened in for example the case of Korea). While such ‘graduation’ may take a 
while, simple correlations are on this background likely to show a negative relationship; and they 
will for sure not reveal the ‘true’ impact of aid. 
In the modern aid-growth work, the analyst can attempt to control for the impact of a large 
range of variables, and becomes in this way able to move somewhat closer to the ideal of having a 
reliable counterfactual.16 The analyst is, at least in principle, capable of addressing issues such as 
the identification problem inherent in having aid allocated endogenously in the foreign aid system. 
Second, a focus on growth makes it in a wider perspective possible to draw on both traditional 
growth theory and new growth models to illustrate how aid can potentially impact through a highly 
diverse set of channels.17 Third, macroeconomic studies are required in order to help generalize 
about the overall impact of aid on growth and economic development. Fourth, the aid-growth 
 
15 The reader may wish to consult for example Cassen and associates (1994) for a useful survey with a broader scope 
than the present paper. Other references include World Bank (1998) and (2000). 
16 The same can be said about the use of randomized programme evaluation, which I do not pursue as already noted 
above. For perspective see Thorbecke (2005). 
17 For a pertinent cautioning set of observations see Solow (2001). 
 14
literature continues to be highly influential in shaping common perceptions about the significance 
and impact of foreign aid. Fifth, whether aid helps growth or not is essentially an empirical 
question. 
The quantitative cross-country analyses of the macroeconomic impact of foreign aid on 
growth, which by now spans almost four decades, can be classified into three generations, see 
Hansen and Tarp (2000). Work in the first two generations (where aid’s impact on growth via 
savings and investment was in focus) was inspired by the simple Harrod-Domar model and the two-
gap Chenery-Strout extension. This framework was as mentioned in Section 3 used extensively in 
the past as the analytical framework of choice for assessing aid impact; but from the early 1990s a 
third generation of panel based econometric studies came to dominate the academic and public 
discourse. This work was motivated in part by the availability of much better (panel) data across a 
range of countries and in part by insights emerging from new growth theory and the rapidly 
increasing number of general empirical studies of growth. In addition, the endogeneity of aid and 
other variables is addressed more consistently than before,18 and the aid-growth relationship is 
appropriately perceived as non-linear. 
The underlying idea behind the Harrod-Domar model was indeed simple. Assume that 
physical capital is the only factor of production (so investment is the key constraint on growth) and 
assume as well that all aid is invested. Then it is straightforward to calculate the growth impact of 
additional aid. If aid corresponds to six per cent of the gross national product and the capital-output 
ratio is estimated at 3.0,19 which is a rather typical estimate, then aid adds two percentage points a 
year to the growth rate. The impact of aid is clearly positive, and aid works by helping to fill either 
a savings- or a foreign exchange gap, where the latter relates to the argument that aid represents 
foreign currency and as such can facilitate imports of goods and services that may in some cases be 
critically important in output production over and above aid’s impact on relieving the savings 
constraint. This kind of reasoning has, however, led to wildly overoptimistic expectations about 
aid’s potential impact. 
First, it is a tall order to expect both a linear relationship between output and capital and that 
all aid is invested. Aid is as discussed in Section 3 provided for many reasons. For example, food 
aid in famine situations is not intended as investment. In addition, the share of aid that ends up 
being invested (rather than consumed) will, in even the very best of circumstances, depend on the 
degree of fungibility of the foreign aid transfer.20 On the other hand, even if aid adds to domestic 
savings and investment on less than a one to one basis, aid does continue to have a positive impact 
on growth in the traditional line of thinking – as long as total savings and investment go up.21  
A second line of critique of the Harrod-Domar and two-gap approach has been the argument 
that growth is less related to physical capital investment (including aid) than often assumed 
 
18 The wider ranging and complex econometric endogeneity problems inherent in relying on time averages for aid and 
growth, typically used in panel data growth regressions are laid out in Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp (2004). They point 
out that not only aid but also policy is likely to be endogenous. 
19 Note from Figure 1 that the annual median aid to GNI ratio amounted to 6.8 per cent from 1993 to 2002. 
20 Fungibility arises when the recipient can reallocate own resources to other ends when aid is provided. There is limited 
and conflicting evidence on the degree of fungibility of foreign aid, see for example Feyzioglu, Swaroop and Zhu 
(1998). 
21 This observation goes back to Papanek (1972, 1973) and inspired Hansen and Tarp (2000), who reviewed 131 cross 
country regressions produced over three decades. They challenged the widespread perception among academic 
researchers and aid practitioners that there is no significant macroeconomic links associated with foreign aid as stated 
by for example Michalopoulos and Sukhatme (1989) and White (1992). A re-examination of the then existing literature 
revealed that (i) aid increases savings, although not by as much as the aid inflow, (ii) aid increases investment, and (iii) 
aid has on average a positive effect on the growth rate whenever growth is driven by capital accumulation. Hansen and 
Tarp therefore suggested that the micro-macro paradox identified by Mosley (1987) to which I shall return below is 
non-existent – even in the context of the traditional aid-growth literature. 
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(Easterly, 2001). If the key driver of the productive impact of aid is related more to incentives and 
relative prices and more generally to the policy environment then it becomes important to consider 
potentially distortionary effects of aid on incentives and economic policies in the aid receiving 
system and vice versa. An example is ‘Dutch disease’, and domestic demand and resource 
allocation may be twisted in undesirable directions following a large aid inflow if macroeconomic 
management is weak. One concrete example is that aid donors often pay much higher wages to 
national experts and staff than equally – or in many cases – more important national institutions.22  
Third, a large and growing literature on the political economy of aid, see for example 
Kanbur (2003), Gunning (2005) and Svensson (2000), has argued that if aid allows a recipient 
government (local elites) to pursue behaviour that is in any way anti-developmental then the 
potential positive impact of aid can be undermined. There are many such examples available in 
practice ranging from outright misuse of aid by corrupt governments to more subtle issues such as 
the potential negative impact of aid on domestic taxation (Adam and O’Connell, 1999). 
The third generation debate about aid’s impact on growth is rooted in the above kinds of 
observations as well as in Mosley’s (1987) micro-macro paradox. He suggested that while aid 
seems to be effective at the microeconomic level,23 identifying any positive impact of aid at the 
macroeconomic level is harder, or even impossible. In fact, the micro-macro paradox seemed self 
evident to many at the time it was formulated where the general atmosphere was one of aid fatigue 
and lack of belief in a positive impact of aid on growth. Another explanation, which can be referred 
to as the ‘iron law of regressions’, received less attention. It must never be overlooked that once we 
try to explain a ‘dirty’ dependent variable with noisy data and weak proxies it should come as no 
surprise that the result is biased towards zero, or in this case even towards the negative given the aid 
allocation behaviour of donors. What Mosley and many after him have struggled with is how to 
control for the wildly changing circumstances under which aid has been implemented. We can (and 
should) look to history and try to treat it as a controlled experiment, but we are at the end of the day 
limited by the extent to which our proxies capture the massive changes in circumstances under 
which aid is implemented over time and across countries.  
Boone (1994) managed to stir up the aid-growth debate again in the early to mid-1990s. His 
work was cited in The Economist on 10 December 1994 under the colourful heading: ‘Aid Down 
the ‘Rathole”, and Boone did indeed suggest that aid does not create, nor correlate with those 
underlying factors which cause growth. Boone did not, however, occupy centre stage for long. His 
underlying theoretical model was qualified by Obstfelt (1999). Moreover, Boone treated the aid-
growth relationship as linear, and did not account for the potential endogeneity of aid. Finally, and 
much more importantly, a highly influential idea spread, in part due to effective backing by the 
World Bank. This is the idea that while aid has on average no impact on growth aid may still work 
in some countries or time periods. Burnside and Dollar (1997, 2000) pursued this and argued that 
‘aid works, but only in countries with ‘good policy’’. They based this conclusion on an aid-policy 
interaction term, introduced to capture the non-linearity between aid and growth, and this term 
emerged as statistically significant in their panel data analysis. In sum, Burnside-Dollar provided an 
attractive and very elegant solution to the micro-macro paradox with clear-cut and easy to interpret 
policy implications, which were in addition very much in line with orthodox development thinking. 
Burnside and Dollar, and more recently Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002), have used the 
foregoing framework as a basis for suggesting that aid should be directed to ‘good policy’ countries 
to improve aid’s impact on poverty alleviation. The index meant to capture ‘good policy’ has 
gradually been expanded from the Burnside-Dollar focus on budget surplus, inflation and openness 
 
22 See Rajan and Subramanian (2005a) for a recent contribution. 
23 Dalgaard and Hansen (2005) also discuss the micro-economic evidence on positive ex-post rates of return of World 
Bank aid projects, referred to above. Median returns range between 10 to 30 per cent for the period 1996 to 2001. 
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to the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index.24 The argument for 
allocating aid selectively is also, at least partly, justified with reference to the finding that the 
amount of aid countries receive has no impact on the quality of their macroeconomic policies, a 
finding that also appeared to emerge from Bank-funded research (Devarajan, Dollar, and Holmgren 
2001).25 While the Bank’s Monterrey document (World Bank, 2002) toned down these 
recommendations, and the World Bank (2005b) strikes a very different line of argument in its 
interpretation of the policy reform process during the 1990s, the basic thrust in much of the 
international aid debate remains that macroeconomic performance evaluation and policy criteria 
should play a key role in aid allocation. 
The thorny academic dilemma in all this includes that: (i) Hansen and Tarp (2001) found 
that the Burnside-Dollar result is far from robust. In fact, it appeared at the time that diminishing 
returns where aid squared is introduced into the analysis to capture non-linear effects between aid 
and growth was the empirical specification with most support in the data. In contrast, the data did 
not support the Burnside-Dollar aid-policy interaction term;26 (ii) Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) 
showed the same with the Burnside and Dollar data set, once it had been made available to 
researchers outside the World Bank, performing a general-to-specific test; (iii) Easterly et al. (2004) 
found the Burnside-Dollar aid-policy story to be fragile in the face of an expansion of the data set in 
years and countries; and finally (iv) Roodman offers a comparative assessment of the large number 
of stories on the relationship between how much foreign aid a country receives and how it grows, 
which the contemporary econometric literature has generated. He concludes that the aid-policy link 
(identified by Burnside-Dollar) proves the weakest, while the aid-tropics link (identified by 
Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp, 2004) is most robust.  
Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp argue that aid and policy both depend on the average rate of 
growth even though they are predetermined in the original system. They therefore take account of 
this in their empirical testing, which also controls for the potential endogeneity of institutions. In 
their attempt at assessing the importance of structural characteristics on aid effectiveness they add 
the fraction of land in tropical areas as a proxy for climate related variables, and this variable and its 
interaction with aid outperform both the ‘good policy’ and ‘the diminishing returns’ model. In 
concluding, Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp make the point that it does appear from the data as if aid 
has been far less effective in tropical area over the last 30 years. They also stress that it is hard to 
believe that aid should, inherently, be less potent in the tropics. The real explanation for the aid-
tropics link is in their assessment likely to lie elsewhere; and they call for further research to help 
disentangle the channels through which aid matters for productivity and efficiency. Their result also 
highlights that while there is certainly merit in more sophisticated versions of arguments for 
selectivity, macroeconomic allocation rules depend critically on understanding of the complex links 
 
24 The CPIA index assesses the quality of a country’s present policy and institutional framework in 20 different 
dimensions, assessed by World Bank experts on a scale from 1 to 6. Each item has a 5 per cent weight in the overall 
rating. The items are grouped into four categories: ‘Economic Management’, ‘Structural Policies’, ‘Policies for Social 
Inclusion/Equity’ and ‘Public Sector Management and Institutions’. 
25 This volume was reviewed by Tarp (2001). 
26 The turning point at which increased aid will start having a negative impact on growth was originally estimated 
around 25 – 40 per cent. This is, as is clear from Figure 1, very far above the typical aid country, and Hansen and Tarp 
(2000) warned that the empirical identification of the turning point should in any case be interpreted with great care. 
The diminishing returns thesis was not put forward as a definitive statement about how aid impacts, or what would 
happen if aid was increased, more as a way of characterizing the data and putting the fragility of the Burnside-Dollar 
policy story into perspective. When trying to capture non-linearities in the aid-growth relation it is advisable to test all 
respectable alternative economically and statistically meaningful specifications before conclusions are drawn. In sum, 
the diminishing returns story should not be interpreted as an argument against more aid per se. 
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in particular country circumstances between aid, growth and development objectives such as 
poverty reduction.  
What this (and the long list of other studies listed in for example Clemens, Radelet and 
Bhavnani, 2004) adds up to can in my assessment be summarized as follows: 
 
• It may well be true that ‘aid pays a growth price’ as growth regularly gives way to other 
concerns as the most important criterion for aid.27 Yet, the single most common result of 
recent empirical aid-growth studies is that aid has a positive impact on per capita growth.28 
At the same time, aid is by no means a panacea for growth and poverty reduction. 
• The way in which data are dealt with to address the complex issue of identifying the impact 
of aid on growth is critically important for the conclusions drawn. Methodological choices 
matter. 
• The impact of aid on growth is not the same across aid recipients. There are differences in 
aid efficiency from country to country; and it remains unclear what drives these differences. 
In particular, the importance of ‘deep’ structural characteristics in affecting how aid impacts 
on growth is not yet fully understood.  
 
Furthermore, using ‘good policy’ (in the form of the CPIA index) as a basis for allocating aid 
selectively is questionable. There are at least three reasons: 
 
• An attraction of the original Burnside-Dollar index was its simplicity. It was controversial 
but easy to interpret. It is much harder to derive clear cut policy advice based on any 
positive interaction between aid and the CPIA. The CPIA is, as already noted, a composite 
index of 20 different variables grouped in four categories. In spite of the descriptive value of 
the CPIA index, which I do not question, it is from an analytical point of view far from easy 
to decipher what drives aid efficiency when indicators of ‘economic management’, 
‘structural policies’, social policies’ and ‘public sector management and institutions’ are 
aggregated into one measure. In addition, trade-offs between the elements of the index are 
bound to arise in practice. For example, placing greater emphasis on budget balance (an 
element in ‘economic management’) may well be in conflict with improving health care, 
education etc. belonging to the component ‘building human resources’ which forms part of 
‘policies for social inclusion/equity’. Improved budget balance may also lead to a lower 
‘pro-poor expenditure index’ shown to be poverty reducing by Mosley, Hudson and 
Verschoor (2004). 
• The changes in the CPIA index may well be caused by the growth performance, in which 
case the CPIA should not be used as an exogenous variable.29 Moreover, Mauro (1995) 
highlights that using expert evaluations may be problematic, the argument being that an 
 
27 Food aid in famine situations geared toward increased consumption is a specific case in point as is, more generally, 
aid for consumption that is not investment targeted. 
28 Dalgaard and Hansen (2005) estimate that the aggregate real rate of return on foreign aid financed investments is in 
the range of 20-25 per cent. Rajan and Subramanian (2005b) are more critical, and their approach to the use of external 
instruments in cross-section analysis is potentially interesting, provided strong exogenous instruments can be found. 
This remains to be seen. Their account of the panel data literature needs considerable revision to become comparable 
with existing studies referred to above. 
29 Similar concerns are alluded to by Cornia (2005) when he points out that it far from clear what can be concluded 
based on negative correlation between ‘bad governance/corruption’ and ‘slow/negative growth in GDP per capita’. It 
may – in Cornia’s formulation – be that other unobserved variables are at work, such as ‘high illiteracy and low land 
productivity that simultaneously reduce growth and the salaries of civil servants, who therefore asks bribes whenever 
possible’. 
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evaluator is likely to conclude that a particular set of institutions is good if the country in 
question is growing rapidly. 
• The use of ‘good policy’ may lead us to punish countries with unfavourable conditions 
instead of helping them. This is so since there is a very high probability that a country with a 
low CPIA is in the tropical region. If the variation in aid effectiveness across countries is not 
policy induced, but rather a result of poor initial conditions, a different approach to 
allocating aid has to be established. At the same time, every effort has of course to be made 
to help put in place improved policy, which helps growth and poverty reduction.  
 
In sum, it is advisable to be alert about what is in fact unknown. This implies, for example, that 
more attention should be given in future research on foreign aid and development to different 
modalities of aid (such as project versus programme assistance) and their design and application in 
different types of aid receiving countries. One difficulty in this is that it is by no means 
straightforward to derive general results across countries with available theory and data.30
 To put this in further perspective, it may be useful to take a pragmatic look at the aid-growth 
data in Table 4 (and the three additional tables in the Annex), which illustrates the difficulties of 
coming up with simple aid-growth stories. Inherent in this table is the following question: ‘Does aid 
above/below average in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s help determine whether countries were 
successful in terms of growth in the subsequent decades’? As is clear from the table there are 16 
categories of aid-growth experiences. They can be summarized as follows in four sets of growth 
experiences: 
 
• 18 countries experienced negative growth in both the 1980s and 1990s. The clear majority 
of countries in this group received below average aid in both the 1970s and 1980s. Only two 
countries (Djibouti and Gabon) are associated with above average aid in both decades. 
• 11 countries experienced positive growth in the 1980s, but negative growth in the 1990s. 
Most of these countries received below average aid in both decades. There is only one case 
where aid remained above average (Guinnea-Bissau), and only two countries where aid 
went from below to above average aid (Gambia and Somalia). 
• 33 countries had negative growth in the 1980s, but positive growth in the 1990s. The 
majority of countries in this group had below average aid in both the 1970s and 1980s. 
There is only one country where aid went from above average to below average aid (Fiji).  
• 48 countries had positive growth in both the 1980s and 1990s, the majority with below 
average aid in both the 1970s and 1980s. Two countries (Jamaica and Lesotho) moved from 
below average to above average aid, and three went from above to below average aid 
(Egypt, Swaziland and Tunesia).  
 
It should be recognized up-front that the implicit 10 year aid-growth impact lag in Table 4 is 
longer than the four-year lag that is typical in cross-country regression work, and I reiterate that this 
kind of empirical overview can at best be illustrative. No causality can be implied. Yet it does seem 
to me that while there is little in this that identifies aid as a highly potent driver of growth and 
development across the board (aid cannot buy growth and development), there is even less in Table 
4 to suggest that aid has done harm from an overall point of view.31  
 
30 See Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani (2004) for an attempt, relying on cross country data.  
31 In addition to the results included in the Annex, we have experimented with a series of alterative groupings and 
classifications, including for example varying growth rates. The overall picture remains the same. 
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Table 4. Aid and growth, 1970-2000 
  Negative growth (1990-2000) Positive growth (1990-2000) 
  Aid below average (1980-90) Aid above average (1980-90) Aid below average (1980-90) Aid above average (1980-90) 
Algeria Liberia Sao Tome and Principe Argentina Namibia Costa Rica   
Angola Madagascar     Bolivia Nicaragua El Salvador   
Cen. African Rep. Niger     Ethiopia Nigeria Equatorial Guinea 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Sierra Leone     Ghana Panama Senegal   
Cote d'Ivoire Togo     Guatemala Peru     
Ecuador Zambia     Guyana Philippines     
Haiti      Iran, Islamic Rep. Saudi Arabia     
Honduras      Lebanon Trin. and Tob.     
Iraq      Malawi Uganda     
        Mali Venezuela, RB     
Aid below 
average 
(1970-80) 
        Mozambique       
    Djibouti   Fiji   Kiribati Suriname 
    Gabon     Mauritania Syrian Arab Republic 
            Pa. New Guinea Vanuatu 
Negative 
growth 
(1980-90) 
Aid above 
average 
(1970-80) 
            Samoa   
Burundi   Gambia, The   Bangladesh Mauritius Jamaica   
Cameroon   Somalia   Barbados Mexico Lesotho   
Chad       Benin Morocco     
Kenya       Bhutan Myanmar     
Mongolia       Brazil Nepal     
Paraguay       Burkina Faso Pakistan     
Rwanda       Chile Sri Lanka     
        China Sudan     
        Colombia Tanzania     
        Dom. Republic Thailand     
        Guinea Turkey     
        India Uruguay     
        Indonesia Vietnam     
        Lao PDR Zimbabwe     
Aid below 
average 
(1970-80) 
        Malaysia       
Congo, Rep.   Guinea-Bissau   Egypt, Arab Rep.   Ant. and Bar. Oman 
        Swaziland   Belize Seychelles 
        Tunisia   Botswana Solomon Islands 
            Cape Verde St. Kitts and Nevis 
            Dominica St. Lucia 
            Grenada St. Vinc. and Gren. 
Positive 
growth 
(1980-90) 
Aid above 
average 
(1970-80) 
            Jordan Tonga 
Note: Aid is ODA/capita in constant US$, and growth is average annual growth in GDP/capita 
Source: World Bank (2005c) 
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Hard and clear cut evidence is difficult to uncover from this kind of analysis. There is no simple 
answer. We are instead left with lots of special cases, where country specific circumstances have 
played a key role in determining the growth outcome and how donors reacted in the allocation of 
aid. This is one motivation why cross country regression analysis has been so popular. Data are after 
all the plural form of anecdotes. But the picture in Table 4 also helps suggest why controversy 
remains. 
 
5. Discussion of the current aid and development debate 
 
Has foreign aid been a success or failure in promoting development? Based on some of the most 
influential contributions to the foreign aid literature over the past decade, including for example the 
works of Boone, Burnside-Dollar, Sachs and Easterly, it might appear that ‘The answer, my friend, 
is blowin’ in the wind’.32 Boone (2006) has recently reiterated that ‘the history of large aid flows is, 
to date, a major failure’, while Burnside-Dollar (2000) found that aid promotes growth, but only 
when policy is ‘good’.  
On the other hand, Sachs (2005) and the UN Millennium Project (2005) argue emphatically 
that aid has worked and should be ‘scaled up’. Sachs has played a key role as special adviser to the 
UN Secretary General on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and he makes a concerted 
effort to reinstate many of the traditional arguments within development economics for believing aid 
works in helping poor countries break out of poverty traps. He refers to investments attuned to local 
needs and uses a vocabulary, which is phrased along gap-filling lines of thinking. He also dismisses 
corruption and domestic policy failure as the fundamental ‘cause’ of Africa’s problems, and argues 
instead that the causal links originate in poverty and the lack of growth. Sachs furthermore provides 
(p. 259) ‘ten dramatic examples that prove the naysayers wrong’. These examples, which are 
referred to as ‘clear aid triumphs’, range from aid’s contribution to the Green Revolution of Asia to 
the eradication of smallpox and polio and on to the mobile phone revolution in Bangladesh. They 
demonstrate in Sachs’ words (p. 265) some common themes. ‘First and foremost, scaling up is 
possible when it is backed by appropriate and widely applicable technology, organizational 
leadership, and appropriate financing’; and he goes on to state that in ‘the case of the Millennium 
Development Goals, the promising technologies exist, but have not been scaled up’. 
Cornia (2005) pointedly notes that Sachs deserves a lot of credit for his ‘passionate 
advocacy’. Moreover, Sachs does manage to call attention to at least some of the ways in which aid 
has helped poor people in the past, and his suggestion that much more can and should be done and 
his menu of initiatives deserve in my assessment attention.33 At the same time, it is as argued by 
Cornia problematic that so much of the present development debate is being cast in terms of 
increases in aid flows for the achievement of the MDGs. This is to quote Cornia ‘reductionist’ as it 
ignores that the development process is much more sensitive to macroeconomic, financial and 
technological changes (or their lack thereof) than to the aggregate volume of aid. In addition, even if 
it is accepted that aid works, and works well, it is unlikely that the MDGs can be reached if aid is 
increased to 0.7 per cent of donor GNI as argued by Sachs. The return will in even the best of 
circumstances not be big enough. I am afraid that mobilising such optimistic expectations may in the 
final analysis lead in a few years to frustration and an undesired backlash.  
Easterly has over the years been an articulated critic of foreign aid, and in his latest 
contributions (Easterly, 2005, 2006), he attacks the UN Millennium Project and the work of Sachs 
head on. He refers to the white man’s burden and ponders ‘Why the West’s efforts to aid the rest 
 
32 Bob Dylan song, where the full text is available at http://www.bobdylan.com/songs/blowin.html  
33 The UN Millennium Project (2005) goes on to recommend no less than 449 interventions to end poverty. 
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have done so much ill and so little good’. Easterly deserves a lot of credit for demonstrating in his 
many writings that much went wrong in aid in the past, and he is absolutely right in identifying the 
lack of attention to micro-economic incentives as a particularly sore point. Much can – and should – 
be gained in thinking about aid in the future from taking this to heart.34 At the same time, his 
sarcastic style and his lashing out at anyone, who seems to argue that aid may have something to 
offer, and his rejection of any type of ‘planning’ and coordination is far from balanced.35 It is as if 
the word ‘planning’ triggers him off, and makes him conclude the exact opposite, i.e. ‘the right plan 
is to have no plan’. Easterly is right in pointing out that a lot of individual initiative has been stifled 
over the years under the burden of dogmatic and centralized planning practices and bureaucratic 
incompetence. Human initiative and appropriate incentives are correctly identified by Easterly as 
two critically important elements in making development happen. However, it is in the context of 
the present paper unfortunate that Easterly fails to distinguish issues of foreign aid from issues of 
appropriate development strategy. It is crucial in evaluating the effectiveness of aid to distinguish 
failures of the aid process from failures of overall development strategy;36 and this Easterly seems to 
ignore. As an aside much of our present knowledge about what works and what does not work in 
development is based on research sponsored by aid agencies (including much of both Easterly’s and 
Sach’s work – as well as my own!). 
Summing-up, Easterly and Sachs have done a commendable job in energizing the current 
debate about foreign aid; but looking ahead it is important that their respective conflicting 
approaches do not get in the way of much needed constructive and forward looking dialogue about 
how best to design and implement aid in the future. The way in which I would summarize the 
existing situation of the current aid and development debate is therefore that there does seem to be 
consensus about at least the following three points: 
 
• Much has been learnt from both successes and failures about development and development 
policy over the past 50 years, and lots of disagreement remains as well. On many questions 
our profession is still searching for appropriate answers.  
• The more than one billion people, who are living in extreme poverty in today’s world, should 
not be left to themselves. Birdsall, Rodrik and Subramanian (2005) state: ’developed 
countries should not abandon the poor to their plight’; Easterly (2005) notes: ‘Aid can still 
do much for the poor’; and even Boone (2006) argues that: ’The aid successes with which we 
are all familiar … are important’. Much of the controversy in the academic and policy debate 
is about aid’s performance in the past. The need and relevance of such action in the future is 
(ignoring the ‘pure’ ideologists aside) not disputed,37 but whether such action is justified by 
political, economic or moral considerations varies. 
 
34 See Roland-Holst and Tarp (2004) for an elaboration of this point and a set of examples. 
35 It is certainly amusing to read about ’Bono, Sachs, the Dalai Lama, and the pope’ in Easterly (2001, p. 126), but 
Easterly (2006) creates far too many caricatures. While it may be good analytical economics to simplify the world, the 
real world and the development process are more complicated than that.  
36 Aid failure comes in two forms. First is failure in the aid strategy where aid is pursued in spite of the fact that we 
know it fails to support any of the elements of successful development strategy. An example is programme lending in an 
environment where the recipient simply diverts fungible resources to unproductive uses. The second kind of aid failure 
relates to aid delivery, including design, modality or implementation. Examples here include transferring inappropriate 
technology, relying on inadequate technical assistance personnel or ignoring (in Easterly’s terminology) that ‘incentives 
matter’. 
37 To illustrate, I fully acknowledge the key incentive and agency problems associated with aid transfers such as those 
uncovered by Svensson (2000, 2005), and he does not on this basis conclude that aid is without potential impact on the 
development process. 
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• There are many examples where aid has worked at the micro-level to the benefit of 
developing countries and their populations. It is also true that aid is far from flawless. There 
are many cases where aid has not worked to help the poor. Sachs (2006) notes: ’Current aid 
suffers from four inter-related flaws’, and goes on to pinpoint these flaws. Whether all this 
adds up to a positive net impact on growth at the macro level is contentious.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Controversy is rampant in the debate about aid and development. This is not particularly 
surprising. Even a cursory look at history shows that development over the past 30-50 years has 
been a complex and variegated process. There have been interrelated changes in resource 
accumulation, population growth, growth in knowledge and improvements in production 
technology, all operating in an environment, characterized by frequent and dramatic transformations 
in politics and institutions.38 Moreover, social science lacks the ability to carry out fully controlled 
experiments and therefore has to rely on interpretations of history. The analyst must be aware of the 
dangers of over-simplification, and single-cause theories have not fared well in development 
economics. This reflects that simple policy recommendations are often inappropriate in a complex 
world, and this is so whether such recommendations have emanated from the planning tradition of 
the 1960s and 1970s or from the free market thinking of the 1980s. 
 On this background, I have tried to highlight in this paper that one cannot conclude that aid 
has been a failure just because growth in for example Africa has been less than desired, or because 
projects have failed. It is exceedingly easy to arrive at a negative association between aid and 
growth, but such correlations do not provide a definitive causal answer. There is no logical 
inconsistency in development terms between little growth and aid inflows of the size experienced in 
the past. Aid allocation matters for the analysis; and complex development problems and issues are 
looming in the background. Major changes have taken place in the global economy and affected the 
environment in which aid is implemented, and targets for aid have been changing from one decade 
to the next. Simple correlation analysis or story telling cannot – and should not – be allowed to settle 
the causality debate on their own; and aid has in any case been of much too limited a size relative to 
the size of the problem to turn the wheels of history. 
 I recognize as should be clear from this paper that cross-country econometric studies are 
associated with critical methodological choices, and that many significant changes have taken place 
in the world economy over the past decades. Coming up with the ‘true’ aid-growth relationship is far 
from easy, and aid is of much too limited size to turn the wheels of history. Yet, this does not make 
it justified to reject aid as a useful instrument in the fight against poverty. If we are agreed that aid 
works at least somewhere and sometimes, then aid must be outright harmful elsewhere for the 
average impact to be nil. I can follow that some aid has not done all that much good, and this is a 
shame. Yet, there is a significant difference between doing little good and doing outright harm. I fail 
to see that the empirical evidence adds up to a suggestion that a lot of ill has actually been done 
across an important sample of countries. Similarly, it is one thing to call attention to problems that 
should definitely be addressed, it is quite another to dismiss foreign aid as harmful. My overall 
assessment is that nuanced and subtle assessments are advisable with the empirical evidence in hand 
at present. 
 Burnside-Dollar added welcome analytical nuance to Boone, as have others; but the 
Burnside-Dollar solution to the micro-macro paradox has been countered over and again in the 
literature and is shown to be highly delicate. Methodological choices do matter. Nevertheless, the 
 
38 See Tarp (2000), and here especially the summary and synthesis (authored with Sherman Robinson). 
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single most common result in the modern aid-growth literature is that aid has a positive impact on 
per capita growth. No excessive claims about parameter sizes and total aid impact should be made 
on this basis. Foreign aid has been associated with development successes and failures, and the 
fundamental analytical problem is that nobody has to date identified the underlying development 
model. We are therefore necessarily working with reduced form models, which are debatable. Yet, 
this should of course not be allowed to totally overshadow the established results at hand. I am in 
this context puzzled that Easterly so often ignores these and instead tries to use cross country work 
as a basis for his critical view of foreign aid. The ‘iron law of econometrics’ suggests that with noisy 
data, a ‘dirty’ dependent variable and weak proxies results will be biased towards zero. The 
challenge is against this background to clarify whether the data still have anything meaningful to 
say; and I believe this is indeed the case when sufficient care is exercised.39
 It is in my assessment justified to argue for increased aid, but expectations about its impact 
on growth should be kept at reasonable levels. This is where the many claims of Sachs and the 
Millennium Project can at times give rise to worry. It would be unfortunate if unrealistic 
expectations about aid impact are built up much along the lines of what happened back in the 1950s 
and 1960s, in the early stages of aid’s existence. At the same time, asserting that (i) aid has a 
positive impact; (ii) should be ‘scaled up’, and (iii) that its impact does not appear to be conditional 
on ‘good policy’, is not in any way in contradiction with suggesting that future aid should be 
carefully redesigned. In this we should draw on the many insights offered by aid critiques, including 
prominent ones such as Easterly. His investigations do as noted by Sen (2006) ‘offer the basis for a 
reasoned critique of the formulaic thinking and policy triumphalism of some of the literature on 
economic development’; but there is a difference between helping to cure a patient and eliminating 
him. It must as well not be overlooked that much is indeed already happening on the foreign aid 
scene. Major shifts have taken place in aid modalities over the past 15 years, and Adam (2005) 
highlights the issues of the role of independent evaluation, of coordination among multiple donors, 
and attempts to sharpen the incentives for recipients to maximize ‘reform ‘effort’. He also argues 
that the general rise of a culture of transparency and accountability is more than superficial, and 
goes on to point out that the March 2005 Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness is an attempt to 
codify some of the best-practice developments observed in a number of countries.40
Turning to the debate about the allocation of aid, there is in my view merit in more 
sophisticated versions of arguments for selectivity. It makes for example little sense to do structural 
adjustment lending when the macro policy environment is ‘bad’ and there is little possibility for 
policy reform. However, I am based on the empirical work on aid effectiveness during the past 
decade convinced that macro criteria cannot – and should not – stand alone in evaluating the 
effectiveness of most development assistance and determining its allocation. ‘Good policy’ can be 
dangerously misleading as the fundamental criterion for aid allocation, and simplistic macro rules-
of-thumb may reinforce the adversity of those living under substandard governance. It is a 
regrettable fact that many of the world’s poorest people live in conditions of substandard national, 
regional, and/or local governance and lack any tenable means of changing these institutions. It 
would be gravely ironic for aid agencies to compound the misfortunes of these people with 
discriminatory aid allocation. We do not at present have the necessary complete and generalized 
understanding of the complex links in particular country circumstances between aid, growth and 
development objectives such as poverty reduction to justify selectivity as the basic approach in aid 
allocation. Country specific circumstances that are difficult to generalize are critical in the 
 
39 One can also note that the conventional wisdom at the end of the 1980s tended to over-emphasize or misinterpret 
studies which had found a negative or insignificant relationship (see Hansen and Tarp, 2000). 
40 The text of this forum is available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf. See also Adam and Gunning 
(2002) and Adam et al. (2004). 
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generation of aid policy advice. This does not mean that old-fashioned conditionality should be 
brought back to rule the way; but it may be time to recognize more openly that development aid 
involves contractual relations between donors and aid recipients, which deserve increased 
attention.41
Turning to my final point, I would like to stress, first, that it would be gravely ironic if we let 
disagreement about overall development strategy and the macroeconomic impact of aid get in the 
way of pursuing practical and useful aid funded activities in poor countries. There is much to 
criticize in foreign aid, but possibilities for constructive and forward looking action should be kept 
in mind throughout. There are in my experience lots of them out there in practice, which deserves to 
be uncovered more precisely and implemented effectively to the benefit of those in need. 
 
41 This is pursued further in Roland-Holst and Tarp (2004). 
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Table A.1. Aid and growth, 1970-2000 
  Negative growth (1990-2000) Positive growth (1990-2000) 
  Aid below average (1980-90) Aid above average (1980-90) Aid below average (1980-90) Aid above average (1980-90) 
Algeria  Liberia Argentina Nigeria Equatorial Guinea   
Congo, Dem. Rep.  Sierra Leone   Bolivia Panama Guyana   
Cote d'Ivoire  Zambia   Costa Rica Peru    
Ecuador      El Salvador Philippines    
Gabon      Fiji Saudi Arabia    
Haiti      Ghana Trin.and Tob.    
Honduras      Guatemala Uganda    
Iraq      Iran, Islamic Rep. Venezuela, RB    
Aid below 
average 
(1970-80) 
Madagascar      Nicaragua      
    Central African Republic Suriname   Kiribati Papua New Guinea 
    Niger   Syrian Arab Republic Malawi Senegal 
    Togo       Mali Vanuatu 
Negative 
growth 
(1980-90) 
Aid above 
average 
(1970-80) 
            Mauritania   
Cameroon       
Antigua and 
Barbuda Pakistan Benin   
Kenya       Bangladesh Sri Lanka Grenada   
Paraguay       Barbados St. Kitts and Nevis Nepal   
        Brazil St. Lucia     
        Chile Sudan     
        China Thailand     
        Colombia Tunisia     
        Dom. Republic Turkey     
        India Uruguay     
        Indonesia Zimbabwe     
        Jamaica       
        Malaysia       
        Mexico       
        Morocco       
Aid below 
average 
(1970-80) 
        Oman       
Congo, Rep.   Burundi   Belize   Burkina Faso   
    Chad   Botswana   Dominica   
    Comoros   Egypt, Arab Rep.   Jordan   
    Gambia, The   Swaziland   Lesotho   
    Guinea-Bissau       Seychelles   
    Rwanda       Solomon Islands   
Positive 
growth 
(1980-90) 
Aid above 
average 
(1970-80) 
    Somalia       St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Note: Aid is ODA share of GNI, and growth is average annual growth in GDP/capita 
Source: World Bank (2005c) 
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Table A.2. Aid and growth, 1970-2000 
  Negative growth (1990-2000) Positive growth (1990-2000) 
  Aid below median (1980-90) Aid above median (1980-90) Aid below median (1980-90) Aid above median (1980-90) 
Algeria Haiti Sao Tome and Principe Argentina Nigeria El Salvador   
Angola Honduras   Ethiopia Peru     
Congo, Dem. Rep. Iraq   Ghana Philippines     
Cote d'Ivoire Madagascar   Guatemala Saudi Arabia     
Ecuador Sierra Leone   Iran, Islamic Rep. 
Trinidad and 
Tobago     
      Malawi Uganda     
      Mozambique Venezuela, RB     
Aid below 
median 
(1970-80) 
      Namibia       
Central African 
Republic   Djibouti   Bolivia Mali Costa Rica Samoa 
Liberia   Gabon   Fiji Nicaragua Equatorial Guinea Senegal 
Niger       Guyana Panama Kiribati Suriname 
Togo       Lebanon   Mauritania Syrian Arab Republic 
Negative 
growth 
(1980-90) 
Aid above 
median 
(1970-80) 
Zambia           Papua New Guinea Vanuatu 
Burundi       Bangladesh Malaysia     
Kenya       Benin Mexico     
Mongolia       Bhutan Myanmar     
Paraguay       Brazil Nepal     
        Burkina Faso Pakistan     
        Chile Sri Lanka     
        China Sudan     
        Colombia Thailand     
        Dominican Rep. Turkey     
        Guinea Uruguay     
        India Vietnam     
Aid below 
median 
(1970-80) 
        Indonesia Zimbabwe     
Cameroon   Gambia, The   Barbados Morocco Ant. and Barbuda Lesotho 
Chad   Guinea-Bissau   Egypt, Arab Rep. Swaziland Belize Oman 
Congo, Rep.   Somalia   Lao PDR Tanzania Botswana Seychelles 
Rwanda       Mauritius Tunisia Cape Verde Solomon Islands 
            Dominica St. Kitts and Nevis 
            Grenada St. Lucia 
            Jamaica 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
Positive 
growth 
(1980-90) 
Aid above 
median 
(1970-80) 
            Jordan Tonga 
Note: Aid is ODA/capita in constant US$, and growth is average annual growth in GDP/capita 
Source: World Bank (2005c) 
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Table A.3. Aid and growth, 1970-2000 
  Negative growth (1990-2000) Positive growth (1990-2000) 
  Aid below median (1980-90) Aid above median (1980-90) Aid below median (1980-90) Aid above median (1980-90) 
Algeria   Sierra Leone  Argentina Nigeria Equatorial Guinea   
Congo, Dem. Rep.   Zambia  Bolivia Panama Guyana   
Cote d'Ivoire     Costa Rica Peru Kiribati   
Ecuador     El Salvador Philippines Malawi   
Honduras     Fiji Saudi Arabia Mali   
Iraq     Ghana Trin. and Tob. Mauritania   
Madagascar     Guatemala Uganda Papua New Guinea 
      Iran, Islamic Rep. Venezuela, RB Senegal   
Aid below 
median 
(1970-80) 
      Nicaragua   Vanuatu   
Gabon   Central African Republic  Suriname       
Haiti   Liberia   
Syrian Arab 
Republic       
    Niger           
    Togo           
Negative 
growth 
(1980-90) 
Aid above 
median 
(1970-80) 
                
Paraguay       Barbados Oman     
        Brazil St. Lucia     
        Chile Sudan     
        China Thailand     
        Colombia Turkey     
        Dominican Rep. Uruguay     
        India Zimbabwe     
        Indonesia       
        Jamaica       
        Malaysia       
        Mexico       
Aid below 
median 
(1970-80) 
        Morocco       
Cameroon   Burundi   Ant. and Barb. Sri Lanka Benin Lesotho 
Congo, Rep.   Chad   Bangladesh St. Kitts and Nevis Burkina Faso Nepal 
Kenya   Comoros   Belize Swaziland Dominica Seychelles 
    Gambia, The   Botswana Tunisia Grenada Solomon Islands 
    Guinea-Bissau   Egypt, Arab Rep.   Jordan St. Vin. and Gren. 
    Rwanda   Pakistan       
Positive 
growth 
(1980-90) 
Aid above 
median 
(1970-80) 
    Somalia           
Note: Aid is ODA share of GNI, and growth is average annual growth in GDP/capita 
Source: World Bank (2005c) 
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